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Apologetic Preface: 
 
 A number of philosophers with a metaphysical orientation have criticized Making Thing 
Happen for its failure to provide an account of the metaphysical foundations or grounds 
or truth-makers for causal and explanatory claims. I originally attempted to write an 
ordinary paper responding to these criticisms but found this to be a very difficult 
undertaking: I realized that I disagreed with my critics about so much that putting 
everything into a an ordinary “linear” argument was impossible. I also realized that 
important elements in my disagreement had to do not just with the ideas of the critics but 
with the rhetorical devices and strategies for conversational control that they sometimes 
employ.   This led me to the idea of writing a dialog that attempts to highlight the latter as 
well as a former. What follows is, I readily admit, a caricature which makes no attempt to 
be fair or balanced.   Many of the philosophers I know who are analytical metaphysicians 
do not share  the affect and attitudes of my Professor Metafisico and many are far more 
knowledgeable about science.  I hope that readers will take the dialog in the spirit in 
which it is intended—as an attempt to be provocative and to raise in sharp, unnuanced 
way some questions that deserve more attention than they have hitherto received.  These 
include issues about just what metaphysical grounding consists in or amounts to, why (or 
when or for what purposes) it is required, and how providing metaphysical foundations 
relates to providing scientific explanations of a more ordinary empirical sort and to 
methodological concerns that at least in the past were regarded as an important 
component of philosophy o science.  In particular, I want to raise the question of whether 
it is somehow required that all philosophers of science do metaphysics or (as I maintain 
and hope) there are kinds of inquiry in philosophy  of science having to do with 
methodology and the interpretation of the  content of the particular scientific theories that 
can be pursued  independently of the kinds of concerns that animate analytical 
metaphysicians.   
Other themes that I have tried to illustrate include the following:   
 
                                                
∗ I am grateful to Bob Batterman, Jim Bogen, Craig Callender, Chis Hitchcock, Peter 
Machamer, John Norton, Matthew Slater, Kyle Stanford, Martin Thomson-Jones and 
Mark Wilson for comments on an earlier draft.  In this case, the usual disclaimer that they 
do not necessarily endorse the ideas expressed in this dialog applies with extra force.  
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1. Ambivalence about science: Many contemporary metaphysicians express great 
respect for science and even claim that what they are doing is in various ways continuous 
with science (either in content or method or both). Yet at the same time they make 
substantive claims and employ methods that don’t seem to be part of any scientific 
discipline, as in their frequent appeals to “intuition” or to notions like metaphysical 
explanation1. This willingness to work both sides of the fence is a great argumentative 
resource, but a bit frustrating to interlocutors.    
 
2. Conversation Control. One of the most striking features of contemporary 
metaphysical discussion, at least to an outsider like me, is the use of rhetorical strategies 
or framing assumptions that both automatically render certain considerations irrelevant 
and automatically render other considerations central to the discussion, regardless of what 
you, the non-metaphysician, would like to be talking about.  In effect, these devices are 
employed to force the conversation to be only about issues the metaphysician regards as 
important. One device for doing this is the adoption of highly expansive conceptions of 
“metaphysics” so that if, e.g., you try to define anything or clarify a concept you are 
making a “metaphysical” claim. Similarly, ordinary empirical claims of some generality 
(e.g. about the dimensionality of spacetime) are taken to be metaphysical claims2. Given 
that virtually everything is metaphysics (or at least that boundaries of “metaphysics” are 
very elastic and ill-defined), it becomes difficult to argue that one is not doing 
metaphysics and the non-metaphysician becomes vulnerable to Metafisico’s rhetorical 
maneuvers (since you are already doing metaphysics, you might as well do it right, which 
requires a discussion of grounding or something similar.) Another device is the 
invocation of various distinctions such as a contrast between those features of science 
that have “merely” epistemic or methodological significance and those that have true 
ontological/metaphysical significance, with only the latter being treated as a fit subject 
for philosophical discussion.  The language metaphysicians use to characterize their 
concerns (frequent use of words like “deep”, “fundamental”, “ ontologically serious” and 
so on, with the apparent implication that non-metaphysical projects are superficial, 
shallow and   non-serious) has a similar rhetorical role in directing philosophical 
discussion, as does the use of phrases like “merely pragmatic” as a term of denigration.   I 
will add that   I’m convinced that most metaphysicians are completely unaware that  the  
rhetorical devices they employ look to those who are not metaphysicians as though they 
are tailor made to achieve such exclusionary effects—instead they think of the devices as 
both natural and completely  innocent. 
 
                                                
1 In addition, I think that a great deal of analytical metaphysics is animated by mistaken 
ideas about the methods actually employed in successful science. However, this is a topic 
for another paper.  
2 To clarify: I’m not opposed to all expansive conceptions of metaphysics. If one    
engages in, say, some wide-ranging, empirically informed exploration of human 
cognition and behavior and calls that “metaphysics”, far be it from me to object. What I 
object to is the use of such an expansive conception as a device to justify the 
characteristic preoccupations of analytic metaphysicians in the manner illustrated below. 
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3. Preferences and Arguments. Related, to (2), expressions of subjective preferences for 
(or value judgments regarding) certain kinds of philosophical work or topics presented as 
though they are “objective”  arguments that require that one only work on these topics. 
From my point of view, it would be very refreshing if more metaphysicians would just 
say that they find doing the metaphysics of grounding more interesting  or worthwhile 
than, say, trying to understand the role of experimentation in causal inference and that  
for this reason they prefer to work on the former. Instead, what we too often get are 
claims that work on the former is logically required if one works on the latter.    
 
4) Details: If you think that you already know that some philosophical position of a 
certain general type must (for metaphysical reasons) be correct, you may not be too 
concerned about working out the details of that position. Apparent problems can be 
dismissed because (since your position is correct) you know it must be possible in 
principle to meet those objections.  
 
5) Methodology. There are many issues and problems, arising in the various sciences, 
that are, broadly speaking, epistemological or methodological in nature These have long 
been regarded as legitimate and important topics for philosophical discussion and, as I 
see it, are central to philosophy of science. They include, for example, investigation (both 
descriptive and normative) of different strategies for learning about nature (including 
investigations of the limits of what can be learned from various sorts of evidence), and 
the characterization and evaluation of various forms of reasoning that figure in different 
areas of scientific and non-scientific investigation.   Work of this sort is pursued not only 
in philosophy of science, but also in statistics, machine learning, discussions of 
experimental design, artificial intelligence, and portions of cognitive psychology, not to 
mention the various sciences themselves.  I would also include under this general heading 
of methodology efforts at clarification of concepts that are central of the various 
particular sciences, as in Kendler (2005).   Analytical metaphysics and allied work in the 
metaphysics of science seems to me to take little notice of methodological issues  and 
concerns of the sort just described. This is partly a consequence of the tendency of 
contemporary metaphysicians to downplay or attempt to abstract away from epistemic 
and “pragmatic” considerations, which makes it difficult to discuss anything relevant to 
methodology.  What follows is in part an attempt to push back against this tendency and 
to argue for the independent value of methodological concerns.    
 
  
 
  
The Dialog   
  
JW: Hi. I’m Jim Woodward. Pleased to meet you. And your name? 
 
M.  I am Professor Metafisico, Ph.D.  
  
JW: What do you work on? 
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M: I’m an Analytical Metaphysician.    
 
JW:   I’m a philosopher of science who works on causation, among other things. 
 
M: That sounds interesting. I’d like to hear the details. 
 
JW: I try to develop the idea that causal claims describe relationships that are potentially 
exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control.  Put slightly differently causal 
claims describe the outcome of hypothetical experiments:  very roughly, X causes Y if 
and only if there is some intervention I  that changes the value of X such that if I were   to 
occur, the value of Y would change. An intervention on X with respect to Y can be 
thought of as an idealized, unconfounded experimental manipulation of X.  When the 
relationship between X and Y is a causal relationship, it will be stable or continue to 
hold—invariant-- under at least some interventions on X.  Causal relationships differ in 
their degree of invariance, with some causal relationships being invariant under a wider 
range of interventions and other sorts of changes than others.  There is more detail in my 
book, Making Things Happen (MTH). 
 
M: Hold it right there. I hate to break the news to you, but your idea is a non-starter -- it 
sounds like you’re saying that whether X causes Y metaphysically depend on what would 
happen to Y under interventions on X.  But that can’t be right. The claim on the right hand 
side of your definition is a counterfactual. Counterfactuals can’t be “barely true”—they 
require “truth-makers” or “grounding”3 in terms of what is non-counterfactual (i.e. 
categorical) and more fundamental.  “Truth supervenes on Being”, as we metaphysicians 
like to say. Interventions and even more so claims about what would happen under 
interventions are not plausible candidates for what is Ontologically Fundamental.   
 
JW: Actually,  the above  “definition ” or bi-conditional  was not intended as a claim  
about metaphysical dependence or anything like that. I put it forward because I thought it 
captured the way that causal claims are used or understood in a number of areas of 
science—especially but not exclusively the social behavioral and biological sciences—
and in common sense reasoning about causation and because I thought   this in turn had 
interesting methodological implications.  I claimed in MTH that this way of thinking 
about causal claims was   fruitful because it helped to clarify what researchers in the 
above disciplines mean or are committed to (or are trying to establish) when they make 
causal claims   and also how such claims relate to ideas about causation advanced by 
philosophers and researchers in other disciplines.   
                                                
3  There are a number of different positions and accompanying terminology that are in the  
general neighborhood of Metafisico’s views. Some writers talk about “grounding” causal 
and other sorts of claims, others about identifying the  “truth-makers” for such claims or 
about specifying what such claims “metaphysically (or ontologically) depend on”. While 
acknowledging these differences, in an effort to make this dialog readable I have 
deliberately lumped these different positions together.   So for “grounds” the reader 
should read: “grounds or truth conditions or…”.  
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I also suggested that interpreting causal claims in this way had a normative or 
regulative significance:  Vague or unclear causal claims may be made disambiguated by 
spelling out the hypothetical experiments with which they are associated.  A related point 
is that we can  often clarify the sort of evidence   and other assumptions needed to 
establish a causal claim on the basis of non-experimental data by reflecting  that this must 
be evidence that is sufficient to establish what the outcome of the associated experiment 
would be, were able to perform it. This helps us to see why and when certain techniques 
such as the use of instrumental variables in econometrics can be used to reliably establish 
causal conclusions. I’ve always thought of these goals as   
interpretive/descriptive/semantic/methodological (methodological for short) rather than 
metaphysical--  somewhat similar in aspiration to  the treatment of causation in  Holland  
(1986 ) or  in  King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) or Morgan and Winship (2007) and 
having some affinities  with  and drawing on ideas from Spirties, Glymour   and 
Scheines, (2009) and  Pearl  (2009). Many of these writers also offer what they call 
“definitions” of various causal notions, but this is more in the service of the  
methodological goals I mentioned  and not because they are interested in making claims 
about “metaphysical dependence”.   In fact, definitions abound  in science and 
mathematics  but they are rarely if ever intended as claims about metaphysical 
dependence—books on real analysis typically define  the continuity of a function in terms 
of the notion of an open neighborhood, but I don’t think they mean to claim that 
continuity metaphysically depends on this notion.  I’ll add, though, that from my point of 
view nothing really turns on my use of the word “definition”—I’m happy to drop it in 
favor of talk of  relationships of mutual constraint between  causal claims and claims 
about the outcomes of hypothetical experiments  or in favor of talk about using the latter 
to elucidate or clarify the former with an eye to the goals described above4.  
 
M:  These people you describe above—I haven’t heard of any of them. Where did they 
go to philosophy graduate school? Who did they study Metaphysics with?  
 
JW:   They  don’t have Ph. D’s in philosophy and they aren’t aiming to do metaphysics. 
Holland is a statistician, King a political scientist, and Pearl a computer scientist.  
 
X:   Well, I don’t mean to be dismissive but it seems unlikely in that case that they will 
be able to make any contributions to  the Fundamental Ontology of causation.  It sounds 
like what they are doing is at best of merely practical or pragmatic interest.  
 
JW: I’m OK with that. More than OK in fact. I think it is worthwhile to do things that are 
of merely pragmatic interest.  That is precisely my point. They aren’t trying to make   
contributions to Metaphysics. They are trying to do something else and similarly for me.  
 
M:  Well, the work you describe may be  of interest to some people outside of philosophy  
in its unambitious way, but it doesn’t sound as though what  either you or they are 
                                                
4 Some of the ideas described in this paragraph are defended in more detail in Woodward, 
forthcoming.  
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proposing has any  “metaphysical depth” to it5.  I fear that it lacks what C.B. Martin and 
others following him have called “ontological seriousness”.   
 
JW: Once again, I’m happy to  agree.  It seems to me that the people I mention  just   
have a different set of interests from you.  And the same is true for me.  Why can’t we 
just agree on a division of labor? You can do metaphysics and I’ll do what interests me.  
 
M: What you call a division of labor is not possible.  By definition metaphysics is 
concerned with “the foundations of  reality” (Chalmers, Manley and Wassserman, 2009, 
p.1), with “Being as such” (van Inwagen, 2007),   and  with “the fundamental structure of 
the world” (Sider, 2009, p. 420)   Everything is thus  suffused with  or at least grounded 
in metaphysics and, as a result,  you can’t not do metaphysics (Sider, p. 420) .   Indeed,  if 
you deny you are doing metaphysics, you  are by that very denial doing metaphysics  
since you must have in mind some conception of what it is that you are not doing and you 
must think that it is possible not to do that.   This itself amounts to a metaphysical 
position which needs to be defended—by doing metaphysics of course.  Oh, and I almost 
forgot,  if you discuss the ideas of anyone who is a metaphysician you also must be doing 
metaphysics (Strevens, 2007) .    
 
JW:   It sounds as you are saying that I have to do what you are doing, according to your 
rules. And you don’t have to provide any motivation or justification for what you are 
doing, since one can’t not do it.  
 
M:  Your description of the dialectical situation  is essentially correct, although rather 
unsympathetically expressed.  Let me emphasize, though, that these requirements 
concerning the centrality and inescapability of metaphysics do  not in any way reflect the 
personal ambitions of  us metaphysicians.  Instead, these requirements flow ineluctably 
from  the foundational role of metaphysics in all inquiry. And since, as we have 
established, you can’t avoid doing metaphysics, you might as well buckle down and do it 
thoroughly  and correctly, even if that means that you never get around to doing any of 
this stuff you call methodology (aside: which wouldn’t be a bad thing at all, in my 
opinion). 
   
JW: I would find it easier to understand what you are getting at if you would stop using 
words like “depth” and “serious” and explain to me exactly what is wrong with being 
interested in the merely methodological.  For example, will I make mistakes in the 
methodological projects that interest me if I fail to provide grounds/truth-makers in your 
sense for causal and counterfactual claims? Will this lead to empirical mistakes of some 
kind?  
 
M: How can any area of inquiry be satisfactory if it is left ungrounded and without 
foundations?  As for specific problems that arise for your project if you fail to provide 
metaphysical foundations, I haven’t worked out the details since I don’t think this is 
                                                
5 Approximately quoting a prominent philosopher of mind commenting on my views at a 
recent conference.  He didn’t intend this as a compliment, but I was happy to agree.  
 7 
necessary, but I think it is obvious that you’ll end up with an account that is unclear, 
incomplete, and subject to other problems as well.  And of course it won’t be 
Ontologically Serious and won’t be a contribution to anything that is   Fundamental.    
 
JW:  But the people mentioned above don’t provide metaphysical foundations and yet 
what they say doesn’t seem to be   confused.  Or if what they say is defective in some 
way, this doesn’t seem to be because they have failed to provide metaphysical 
foundations.  Can you point to specific problems that arise with their accounts because 
they fail to provide metaphysical foundations? For example, Rubin (1974)  and Holland 
(1986) employ  what is in effect a counterfactual treatment of causation, defining  the 
causal effect of  a treatment t with respect to an alternative treatment t’  for a unit u as 
Yt(u) – Yt’(u) where Yt (u) is the value Y would have assumed for unit u if it had been 
assigned treatment t  and Yt’ (u)  is the value Y would have assumed had u instead been 
assigned treatment t’. This is then used to characterize various sorts of assumptions that 
may be used for  reliable inference to causal conclusions from statistical data—the idea is 
that the assumptions must be such that in conjunction with the statistical data, they allow 
you to estimate Yt(u) – Yt’(u) or perhaps the expectation of this quantity E [(Yt(u)) – 
(Yt’(u)]). These ideas are criticized by some, but these criticisms don’t seem to have much 
to do with any failure on Holland’s part to provide a proper metaphysics of causation. 
Pearl, for example, argues that it is often easier and more straightforward  (and we are 
less likely to make mistakes) if we employ graphical methods rather than  variables 
describing counterfactual outcomes like Yt(u) but Pearl’s graphical representations don’t   
supply   truth-makers in the sense that you seem to have in mind either and in any case 
Pearl doesn’t seem to be claiming that  they are metaphysically superior to treatments like 
Holland’s. My own view is that the notion of an intervention provides a   more precise 
clarification of Rubin and  Holland’s notion of the “assignment” of a treatment to a unit – 
a notion which  is left underspecified in their accounts --  but again this doesn’t seem to   
turn on issues having to with metaphysical foundations.  
 
M:  It does sound from your description as though the interests of these people  are, 
sadly, merely pragmatic.  But exactly because of this, I don’t see that what they are  
doing is of any Metaphysical Interest.  You still haven’t told me anything about what the 
truth-makers or grounds are for causal claims.  
  
JW: I thought that we were talking about your claim that various problems will arise for 
what they (and I) are doing if we fail to provide metaphysical foundations. You seem to 
be confusing this claim with  the assumption that they ought to be doing metaphysics 
and/or that only metaphysics is worth doing. This assumption amounts to a  preference 
on your part for certain kinds of inquiry.  You seem to be confusing this preference with 
an argument that what you advocate doing is required or unavoidable.  
 
M: Let me give it another try6. A while back you asserted a bi-conditional linking causal 
claims to the outcomes of hypothetical experiments.  And you also described what you 
were doing as an attempt to capture what those who use causal claims in some areas of 
                                                
6 Thanks to Martin Thomson-Jones for raising some issues connected to what follows.  
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science “mean” or are “committed to” in connection with those claims and that causal 
claims can be clarified by associating them with hypothetical experiments.  But everyone 
agrees that when you assert such a bi-conditional, and particularly when you connect it to 
notions like “meaning”, you  are making a metaphysical assertion – you are making a 
claim about the  grounds or truth- makers (or something similar)  for causal claims. So I 
don’t understand how you can claim that you are not trying to do metaphysics.  
 
JW: I don’t understand why the claims that I make about causation must be interpreted in 
the way you describe.  You seem to be treating this as a forced move of some kind that I 
am required to make.  As I said above, I’m not particularly wedded to describing what 
I’m doing in terms of providing definitions or meanings, especially   if you are going to 
then go on to  interpret what I’m saying in the metaphysical way you  want to foist on 
me. Perhaps it would be better (at least for the purposes of this conversation) if I put what 
I am saying in terms of characterizing a certain set of practices for reasoning about causal 
claims, connecting them up with other sorts of claims, making distinctions among such 
claims and so on. Describing and elucidating aspects of the behavior of certain concepts  
(like “cause” and “intervention”) and connecting them to methodological goals, or 
something along those lines. Surely there are activities of this sort that go on all the time 
in science and among  many who comment on science (both philosophers of science and 
others) , but which we don’t have to view  as bound up with metaphysics in the way you 
have in mind. You seem to be simply stipulating  a notion for “meaning” and, for that 
matter,  “if and only if” that builds in the idea that  one can’t do what I am trying to  do 
without making  heavy –duty metaphysical claims about grounding. Why can’t I just 
decline to accept your stipulation?       
 
That said, I wonder if it wouldn’t be more fruitful to try  another tack.  Perhaps you might  
tell me more about this grounding or truth-making relationship that I’m not adequately 
dealing with. That way I would have a better sense of what I am leaving out.  
 
M: I’d be delighted to—this is the subject of a rich and  flourishing  literature (see, for 
example,   Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, 2009,  and Correia and Schnieder, 2012).  
Let me begin with grounding, although I should acknowledge at the outset that there is a 
fair amount of disagreement about just what this relationship involves or even whether it   
is intelligible  and about whether it is or is not the same thing as truth-making. For 
starters, many think that the grounding relation is  primitive,  and thus it can’t really be 
explained  in terms of anything else (Schaffer, 2009).  But I can tell you about some of its 
properties. For example,  many metaphysicians hold that it is irreflexive, asymmetric and 
transitive. Its asymmetry distinguishes it from more ordinary sorts of definitional 
relationships, which may permit you some choice about which terms one starts off with 
and which terms are defined in  terms of them,  as is often the case with various 
alternative  sets of definitions and axiomatizations in logic and mathematics.  (Think of 
various choices of primitives in propositional logic or in Euclidean geometry.)   This 
contrasts with proper metaphysical   definitions which  express   relations of metaphysical 
dependence.   Here there is a uniquely correct order of definition:  p is defined in terms of 
its grounds or truth conditions q, q is defined  in terms of its  grounding conditions  and 
so on until we reach those entities and relations which are fundamental. Grounding   
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relations thus give us insight into  the  hierarchical structure  of reality, according to 
which   some entities or facts are dependent for their existence on  others, while other 
entities or facts are fundamental, requiring no further  grounding.   Thus, just as 
Philosophy programs should be ranked in a hierarchy, according to their Excellence in 
Metaphysics, so also Reality itself can be ranked, in terms of its relation to what is 
Fundamental. To be is to be Ranked7.   
 
JW: Fascinating. Tell me more.  
 
M: The grounding relation has other properties as well.  For example, it is  
hyperintensional, so that logically equivalent claims can have different grounds. The 
grounding relationship is also related to the best theory we have of everything—the best 
theory should be thought of as a theory of what is fundamental that correctly tracks 
grounding relations (Schaffer, 2009). Among scientifically minded philosophers, it is 
assumed that the best candidate for such a theory is to be found in Fundamental 
Physics—a view to which I myself subscribe. So the grounding entities (or whatevers) 
will presumably include, for example,  elementary particles and fields of the sort 
discussed in fundamental physics. Fortunately, though, we needn’t inquire too closely 
into the details of this—we can take  this aspect of what is fundamental  just  to have to 
do with “point particles and fundamental physical magnitudes” (Schaffer, 2009, P. 370).  
So to sum up, when we metaphysicians  ask for the grounds or truth makers for causal 
claims or claims about laws what we are asking for are facts or entities that stand in the 
kind of  relationship to causal claims and laws that   is common to all of the examples 
described above.   
 
JW: I’m still a little confused. On the one hand, it sounds as though metaphysics and 
grounding, as you describe them, are (at least among scientifically minded 
metaphysicians)  closely connected to physics—apparently to what you think of as 
fundamental physics. On the other hand, I take it that metaphysics is not exactly the same 
thing as physics? So what exactly is their relation? 
 
M: Obviously metaphysics is not the same thing as physics. If it were, what would be left 
for metaphysicians to do? The very fact that metaphysicians keep doing metaphysics, as 
they have done for thousands of years,  and do it, at present, in a way that has no 
influence whatsoever on the  practice of physics,  shows that what we are doing must be 
importantly distinct from physics and the other sciences. As for the relation between 
these disciplines, this is a matter of on-going discussion.  One possible view is that 
metaphysics is inspired in part by physics, but must satisfy other constraints too -- for 
example, consistency with the intuitions of metaphysicians about grounding.  Physicists, 
although admirable in many ways, tend to be inattentive to the need for grounds. For 
example, they may introduce claims about laws of nature, and support these only with 
empirical evidence,  and  physical  arguments about symmetries and so on, while failing 
to specify what the ultimate  grounds for these  law-claims are.  One useful thing that 
                                                
7 Or, in a more “continental” mode, Being Ranks Itself.  
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metaphysicians can do is to step in and provide more adequate grounds for these claims.   
It is your failure to do this that makes your views about causation so defective. 
Another possible view of the relation between science and metaphysics (perhaps not 
sharply distinct from the view just described) is that metaphysicians provide accounts of 
the basic categories in terms of which all scientific theories must be framed—categories 
like cause, law, substance, part and whole and so on. Scientists then fill in the details, 
providing particular examples of causal relationships, laws and so on.  So in this picture 
as well, metaphysics plays a foundational role in science.  
 Yet another other thing that distinguishes us metaphysicians from what physicists do 
is that we are not so interested in, so to speak, actually existing physics, but rather in the 
wider space of   metaphysically possible worlds.   Our aim is to discover what the 
grounds  would have to be for any metaphysically possible physics8. This is why we are 
concerned to make our theories physics-like, or physics-inspired rather than being too 
closely tied to the physical  details of our world,  since the latter course  would lead to a 
regrettable loss of generality.   For example, in discussing laws of nature, we find it most 
useful to think of these just as generalizations of the form “All As are Bs” and  in 
discussing   scientific theories we   represent  them as theory T.  Any further detail would 
just be limiting.  
 Perhaps I should add that as a scientifically oriented metaphysician, I fully accept 
Quine’s dictum that metaphysics is continuous with and “on a par” with science and that 
metaphysicians are just doing at a somewhat more abstract and general level what those 
physicists at CERN who are looking for the Higgs boson are doing. The criteria for a 
good metaphysical theory are at a general level the same as those for a good scientific 
theory, simplicity, great scope, theoretical fertility and so on, as many metaphysicians 
have said  (e.g., Sider  2009).  On the other hand,  it also needs to be borne in mind that 
we are doing something that is more fundamental than any particular science and that 
shouldn’t be judged just by the sorts of pragmatic criteria that are unfortunately 
sometimes employed in the assessment of scientific theories, like usefulness in prediction 
and control, computational tractability  and so on.  
 A good way of summing up is that what we are doing is both science-like and not 
science-like. I hope you find this clarifying.   
 
JW: It would help me if you could provide some more specific examples of grounding. 
 
M: I’m happy to oblige. The literature is full of illustrations:  the disjuncts of a 
disjunction ground the disjunction, geology is grounded in physics,  according to some 
philosophers causal claims are grounded in facts about dispositions, according to other 
philosophers causal claims are grounded in facts about laws of nature,  and laws of nature 
are grounded in relations of necessitation between universals.  According to still other 
philosophers, laws of nature are instead grounded  in facts about the deductive 
systemization of the entire Humean Basis  that achieves a best balance of simplicity and 
strength. Other illustrations:  fists (if they exist—there is dispute among ontologists about 
this) are grounded in hands or shapes assumed by hands,  and  the set whose sole member 
                                                
8 Cf. Lowe (2011) who characterizes  metaphysics “as the science of the possible, 
charged with charting the domain of objective or real possibility…” (p.100) 
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is the empty set is grounded by the empty set.   However, I caution that these are just 
examples.   The grounding relation is the single unique relation that is common to all of 
these particular cases.  Thus when we metaphysicians  ask for the grounds or truth 
makers for causal claims or claims about laws what we are asking for are facts or entities 
that stand in the  relationship to causal claims  and laws that is exemplified in all of the 
above examples.   
 
JW: I’m afraid I’m still not getting it. Why do you think that these are all common 
exemplifications of a   single grounding relationship?   It looks to me that in the first 
example, what you have is an asymmetry of logical entailment between a disjunction and 
its disjuncts. In the second case, you are appealing to some idea according to which the 
entities that are the subject matter of geology are made up of entities like atoms that are 
studied in physics.  So in this case you are talking about some sort of compositional 
relation.   Or perhaps you are claiming the geological  phenomena can be explained in 
terms of (or “reduced to”) relationships that figure in physics  where “explanation” here 
means   scientific or physical explanation.  In still other cases, your grounding relations 
seem to be conceptual or definitional in character. At any event, when you describe all of 
these cases in terms of grounding or truth-making, don’t you risk conflating causal  or 
explanatory dependence (of the sort discovered  in empirical science) with logical 
entailment with part/whole relations with various sorts of semantic or definitional 
relations with… ? I’ve always thought that one of the great achievements of early modern 
era in philosophy was the clear separation of  these notions, which tended to be conflated 
in earlier scholastic thought.  Indeed, don’t locutions like  “truth-maker” encourage such 
conflation, since “making” sounds like a causal notion, but at the same time truth-making 
relations seem to be conceptualized as something very different from ordinary causal 
relationships?  Perhaps you should consider the possibility that there is no single 
relationship that has all of the features of grounding or truth-making, at least as you are 
conceiving of it.   
 
M:  I don’t see how that is possible. Grounding and truth-making have been central to 
metaphysics since Aristotle, if not Thales, and discussion of these continues in the Best 
Departments today. How could all of these people be wrong about whether there is such a 
relationship?  And if there is a grounding relationship, there could hardly be more than 
one, could there?  I mean, what would happen to Fundamental Ontology (not to speak of 
our Departmental Ranking) then? I would say that the very fact that metaphysicians talk 
(and disagree) about grounding (and/or truth-making) shows that  these notions (or at 
least one of them)  must be intelligible  and that is our job to discover its properties.  
 
JW: I see. Let me then try to express a somewhat different worry. You agree that there is 
considerable disagreement among metaphysicians about what grounding (or for that 
matter related notions) involve and how to understand this notion.  
 
M: Oh, yes. This is a very lively area of debate, with a wide spectrum of different views. 
 
JW: But then perhaps you can also see that this puts me at a considerable rhetorical 
disadvantage when metaphysicians like you demand grounds for causal claims and 
 12 
counterfactuals. I mean, if you  cannot agree among yourselves about what you are 
talking about when you ask about grounds, it is going to be difficult for someone like me 
to respond to your demands. 
 
M: That is your problem, not ours. I can tell you that it probably will take some time for 
us metaphysicians to work out the full theory of grounding.  And perhaps, alternatively, 
we will  decide that talk of grounding should be replaced by something else (Truth-
making, Structure or what have you). But we are all agreed that grounding  (or something 
like it) is crucially  important and it is a great failure on your part that you have not 
provided a detailed story about how this works in connection with causal claims and 
counterfactuals, even if we have not yet fully decided what grounding is.  
 
JW: Perhaps we are more likely to get somewhere if we talk more about specific 
examples. Consider the behavior of a macroscopic sample of dilute gas conforming to the 
ideal gas law and other familiar generalizations of thermodynamics. In this case would 
the underlying “grounds” for this behavior consist in, say, facts about its constituent 
molecules and the laws governing their interactions of the sort that would be described in 
statistical mechanics? 
 
M. Something like that.  As I’ve already suggested,  we metaphysicians  largely leave the 
details of which grounding relationships are actually exemplified in our world  to 
physicists, except when they make obvious metaphysical mistakes.   Presumably the true 
grounds in the example you describe  involve far more fundamental physics—truths of 
string theory or something similar.  In any case, the details don’t matter—it is the general 
idea of grounding that is philosophically important. This is why merely providing this  
underlying physics does not by itself answer the metaphysician’s concerns about the 
proper elucidation of the grounding relationship. 
 
JW: Well, here is something that puzzles me. Many, many different assumptions about 
the micro-constituents of matter and their interactions are consistent with the holding of 
the ideal gas law—even the assumption that the gas is a continuum is consistent with this 
law, given the right general assumptions about the behavior of this continuum. The same 
is true of many other aspects of the behavior of macroscopic objects—their behavior is 
surprisingly independent of the details of the underlying physics, often depending only on 
very generic features of that physics. For example, aspects of the behavior of many 
substances of quite different material composition undergoing phase transitions depends 
only on very general features of those systems—their dimensionality, the symmetry 
properties of the Hamiltonians governing these systems and so on. This is why, to 
paraphrase Nigel Goldenfeld  and Leo Kadanoff (1999) , to model a bull-dozer you don’t 
have to model its constituent quarks,  So my question is this: why aren’t the grounds or  
truth conditions (or whatever) for this behavior these more generic features or perhaps a 
disjunction or equivalence class of all theories consistent with the macroscopic behavior, 
rather than whatever highly specific  “low-level” physical truths about strings or 
whatever hold in the actual world? After all, in one obvious sense the macroscopic 
behavior does not depend on these very specific truths at the fundamental level. So  if  the 
grounds for  the behavior of macro-scopic entities   have to do, among other things,  with 
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those features to which we appeal to  provide ordinary scientific explanations of that 
behavior, it seems to me that there is a good case to be made that these  features  in many 
cases are not going to involve highly specific truths of some fundamental physical theory.  
Again, perhaps  this is a reflection of the fact that you are trying to do too many things at 
once with your grounding/truth-making idea—these are supposed to reflect underlying 
physics, provide explanations, provide reductions to supposedly conceptually more 
primitive facts and much more, but maybe a single relationship can’t embody all of these 
features.   
 
M: I haven’t really thought about  the issues  you describe about the independence of the 
behavior of macroscopic objects from the physics that underlies them and, frankly they 
involve details of a sort that bore me. But to the extent you are suggesting that the 
grounds in such   cases are generic or disjunctive facts, your proposal is a non-starter. 
Really, you seem to have no ear for metaphysics at all.   I’ve already emphasized that 
disjunctions cannot be metaphysically fundamental but must rather be grounded in their 
disjuncts. Moreover, it would be contrary to all  Metaphysical Intuition  if something as 
abstract and generic as the symmetry properties of a Hamiltonian could serve as a 
ground. In general, the difficulty of modeling a bulldozer by means of quantum 
chromodynamics is merely pragmatic and of no philosophical significance. When we put 
modeling considerations aside,  we see that the truth-makers for the behavior of 
bulldozers indeed are to be found in the behavior of its constituent quarks (or something 
like that) 
 
JW: Part of the reason why these issues interests me is   that it seems to me that one of 
the great advantages of experimentation, epistemically and methodologically speaking, is 
that one can often  use it to reliably  establish  conclusions about causal relationships  
independently of   underlying details  that would be provided by some lower level theory. 
The interventionist account attempts to capture this observation. For example, a 
researcher may be able to establish that some drug provides a cure for an illness without 
knowing the underlying chemistry of the drug, much less how its action would be 
modeled in quantum field theory. This is another case of  what I was describing above:   a 
kind of independence or decoupling (in this case epistemic independence)  of more 
macroscopic behavior from underlying physical details. From the point of view of 
methodology and discovery the most reliable sources of knowledge about the behavior of  
more macroscopic  systems  often is not found in information about what you are  calling 
grounds or truth makers, insofar as these have to do with fundamental physics. Perhaps 
that is part of the reason I don’t find a concern with grounding, even if intelligible, 
particularly relevant to my interests.   
 
M: I regard   these observations as completely irrelevant. Indeed,  I’m   shocked that you 
would allow your philosophical views about causation or anything else to be influenced 
in this way by merely epistemic considerations. The whole point of our discipline is to 
get behind the merely practical and epistemic and to limn the True Nature of Reality.  
 
JW: OK. Let me try something different.   Consider the counterfactual claim that if right 
now I were to release this cocktail glass   I am now holding in my hand, it would fall to 
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the floor. If you want grounds or truth-makers for this claim, why can’t I just say that 
these have  to do with whatever would figure in a deeper physical explanation of why the 
counterfactual claim is true— e.g., there  is the gravitational force exerted on the glass by 
the earth in accordance with the inverse square law, the fact that as it falls the resisting 
force of the surrounding air, modeled by Stokes law, will be negligible, for an object of 
the dimensions of the glass, the initial conditions of the system once the glass is released 
and… 
 
M: I’m afraid   that once again you’re completely missing the point. What you have just 
described is a mere physical explanation9 and just a particular example of one at that.  To 
repeat: Metaphysicians are after something different  and deeper –- the metaphysics in 
virtue of which your counterfactual is true.  You can supply all the physics you want and 
you still won’t have given me the metaphysics that is so lamentably missing from  your 
account.  What we are looking for are the metaphysical facts and relationships  that 
underlie  and make  true all lawful or causal relationships rather than  specific examples 
of such relationships.  (At the same time, though, let me remind you, as emphasized 
above, that what we are doing is continuous with  and “on a par with” science). In the 
case you mention, for example, a metaphysician will want to know what grounds or 
serves as a truth condition for the inverse square law to which you appealed in your 
physical explanation. Surely you can see that it is not satisfactory to just take the inverse 
square law as metaphysically primitive.     
  
JW:  I wasn’t suggesting that we take the inverse square law as metaphysically primitive, 
if only because I don’t know what “metaphysically primitive” means. I was instead 
hoping we could find a way of talking about laws  that did not get us embroiled in a 
discussion of what is metaphysically primitive or derivative. But perhaps we could make 
better progress if you would give me  a specific example of what count as a  ground or 
metaphysical truth-maker for  a causal or counterfactual or nomological claim.  What 
have metaphysicians proposed along these lines?  
 
M: I’m happy to oblige, although there are lots of candidates, since again this is an area 
in which there is a lot of disagreement.   Some philosophers hold that the truth makers for 
laws (and presumably also for causal claims and counterfactuals) are to be found in 
special entities, ( or properties, or relationships.)  For example, according to Dretske 
(1977), Armstrong (1983)  and Tooley (1987) , the truth-makers or grounds for   laws of 
nature are relations of necessitation between universals,  and according to  other 
philosophers   laws  are made true by facts about dispositions or “active powers” 
possessed by particular objects. Still other philosophers (e.g., Ellis, 2001, Bird, 2007),  
though, think that it follows from the fact that objects possess dispositions and other 
                                                
9 To this it might also be added that in many cases, no one has any idea how to connect 
causal and counterfactual claims in the special sciences to the fundamental laws that 
“underlie” them. Because of this, it is opaque how to connect these laws to issues about 
the testing of such claims, or how to reason with them. Observations about the grounding 
of such claims in fundamental physical law, even if correct, don’t seem to help with such 
issues.  
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plausible assumptions, that there are no laws of nature, at least as usually conceived. I 
myself prefer a second kind of approach, the best systems analysis of laws (hereafter the 
BSA), which strikes me as more scientific in spirit and also promises a satisfactorily 
Humean reduction of the notion of law. 
 
JW: I’d like to hear more about the BSA. I’m relieved to hear that you prefer it to the 
other alternatives you describe because frankly, I’m a more than a little unclear about 
exactly what they accomplish. Suppose I claim that  the gravitational inverse square law 
or the Lorentz force law holds for some domain of investigation. What exactly have I 
added if I then supplement this with the claim that both are made true by a relation of 
necessitation between universals? Presumably this necessitation relation must possess 
features that exactly mimic whatever other features we think are possessed by the Lorentz 
force law and we don’t seem to have any evidence   that the necessitation relation holds 
that is distinct from whatever evidence we have that the Lorentz force law possesses 
these other features. For example, if we think that the Lorentz force law licenses certain 
counterfactuals, then we will also postulate that the associated relation of necessitation 
among universals also operates in such a way that it licenses the same counterfactuals. Or 
suppose I say that every individual  charged object  has a disposition to conform to the 
Lorentz force law and this is what “grounds”  the law. Doesn’t this (at best) just  re-
describe the law in some   new terminology?   Worse, don’t we have a sort of illusion of 
explanation: We claim that the inverse square law or at least the regularity it describes, 
holds “because” of a relation of necessitation between universals  and so on.  But I don’t 
see in what sense we have an “explanation” here, rather than (at best) just a redescription.  
 
M: Well, although I prefer the BSA, I think that, speaking as a metaphysician, you are 
being unfair to the views just described—they needn’t be trivial in the way you suggest. 
For example,  some versions of dispositional accounts make the important and distinctive 
claim that the truth makers are located  “in” individual objects in the form of dispositions 
they possess, as opposed to being located somewhere else that is external to those objects.  
Stephen Mumford (2004) uses this idea to argue that there are no such things as   laws of 
nature, at least as ordinarily conceived. This is certainly a non-trivial claim that has 
generated a great deal of discussion.  If correct, it shows that most physicists 
misunderstand their own discipline—a result that we metaphysicians would welcome, 
since it would demonstrate the great importance of our investigations. 
 
 As for your claim that   accounts are just re-description, I agree that they do not provide 
ordinary scientific or causal explanations. Instead they aim to provide a special kind of 
explanation—  a “metaphysical explanation”.   
 
JW: I’m guessing that we wouldn’t find it very profitable to discuss why what you call 
“metaphysical explanations” should be regarded as explanatory.   I’ll add that  I would be 
inclined to regard it as a liability rather than a virtue of the search for truth makers that it 
apparently can be used to generate questions about where the  truth makers for laws of 
nature are “located”.  But  since we both agree  that  the special entities accounts  are 
unpromising,  why  don’t we move on the BS approach? 
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M: Excellent. Here is the basic idea: Start with the full Humean Basis (HB) — a 
specification  everything that actually happens throughout the entire lifetime of the 
universe, but purged of any references to modality, possibility, causal or lawful relations,  
or anything like that. Then consider alternative systemizations of this HB, looking for 
those that achieve a best balance of simplicity and strength.  The laws will be those 
regularities that are described by the axioms and theorems that are common to all such 
best systemizations. Assessments of simplicity are to be made with reference to a 
canonical or privileged language which consists of predicates corresponding to the  
“perfectly natural properties”.   
 
JW:   And why exactly should we believe that laws are connected in this way to finding  
a best balance of simplicity and strength?    
 
M: The BSA has a clear answer to this question:  these standards --  simplicity,  strength 
and achieving a best balance between them -- are the standards (in fact, the only 
standards) that scientists actually use in choosing among competing theories.  And when 
they are applied to problem of laws they yield an account with all sorts of attractive 
features.  For example, the resulting account satisfies our aspiration for a Humean  
reduction of claims about laws to claims about regularities (or at least to claims about the 
way that regularities fit together in a total system).  
 
JW: So you are saying that these are  the standards that are actually employed in 
scientific  practice in choosing among alternative theories and that when one chooses in 
accord with them, one  picks out   exactly those regularities that scientists   classify as 
laws as opposed to those they regard as accidental? These sound very much like broadly 
empirical claims about scientific practice—very much the sort of descriptive/interpretive 
investigation that I told you that I was interested in when our conversation started. So 
maybe we are not so far apart after all. Claims about metaphysics and grounds/truth –
makers are at least in part tied to empirical claims about the content and practices of the 
various sciences, especially physics. 
 
M: Well, sort of, but I have to admit things are a bit more complicated. It turns out for 
example, that when you apply the BSA to cosmology, various regularities (such as those 
having to do with large scale isotropy and uniformity of mass-distribution of the 
universe) that most cosmologists seem to regard as accidental or non-lawful turn out to be 
laws after all (Cf. Callender, 2004). So if the BSA is correct, we should conclude that 
these scientists were wrong in classifying these regularities as non-laws. 
 
JW: I can certainly understand why naturalistically minded philosophers of science prefer 
the BSA to inflationary metaphysical programs that populate the universe with relations 
of necessitation between universals and their ilk.  I applaud the attempt to provide an 
account of laws that connects with features of scientific practice.   But I don’t want to 
accept the BSA simply on the grounds that it appears less metaphysically extravagant 
than its competitors.   And in this connection, what you’ve just said concerns me a bit.  I 
mean first you motivate the account by appealing to certain standards that you claim 
guide scientific practice   in the identification of laws, and then when those standards 
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apparently lead to generalizations being identified as laws that are not so regarded in 
scientific practice, you conclude that the practice is wrong. Why don’t you instead 
conclude that  your  account  of the practice is wrong—maybe laws don’t have to do with 
trade-offs of simplicity and strength in the way that you claim.   
 
M: While it is true that, as I emphasized earlier, many of us like our work in metaphysics 
to be science-inspired, we certainly don’t want to be uncritical slaves to the 
pronouncements of scientists. Maybe cosmologists are just wrong in regarding 
generalizations about the large-scale isotropy (and so on) of the universe as non-laws.  
That is what our best theory of laws of nature suggests. You don’t think we should 
automatically defer to everything scientists say, do you?   As heirs to a proud humanistic 
tradition that stretches back thousands of years, we should be self-confident enough to 
avoid such “scientism.” 
 
JW: It would help me to understand how the BSA  is supposed to work if we could work 
through a simple example.  
 
M. I’m happy to oblige. Consider a record of the positions, velocities and masses of the 
sun and all of the various planets in the solar system throughout all time.  The Humean 
Basis will include this sort of information. We want to systematize as much of this 
information as possible within a framework that achieves a best balance of simplicity and 
strength.   Now this record will include the information that the planets (if we include the 
asteroid Ceres)  exhibit a regular pattern or spacing in the distance of  their orbits from 
the sun—this is what is known as Bode’s law10. Bode’s law  thus describes a regularity.   
Consider adding this to the Best Systemization as an axiom. The result of doing so  
would be (let us assume) a gain in strength since we will now be able to use this 
regularity to deduce more facts about the behavior of the planets. At the same time, 
addition of Bode’s law to the BS would  result in a  loss of simplicity since the 
systemization now includes an additional axiom.  In assessing this trade-off, we see that 
this loss in simplicity outweighs the gain in strength, hence that the Bode’s “law” does 
not belong to the Best Systemization and is consequently not a law.   
 
JW: This is ingenious but I’m not convinced that it is a very accurate description of the 
way in which the epistemic values that  guide the discovery  of laws relate to one another. 
For one thing, even if we put aside the fact that we do not  have a good account  of 
simplicity of the sort this framework requires, theory construction in science does not 
seem to be guided by the kind of trade-off between simplicity and strength you describe. 
Rather than a trade-off, science (and particularly fundamental science) often seems 
guided by an ordering of these two considerations  in which strength has something close 
to lexical priority over simplicity.  Other things being equal, it is permissible, even 
required, to add complexity, even a lot of complexity, when this contributes to even 
“small” (assuming we know how to measure this)  increases in  strength. Consider  
Newton’s first rule of reasoning: “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than 
                                                
10 Here I am merely reporting a story that is sometimes used to motivate the BSA. In fact 
the story is inaccurate since Bode’s law does not correctly predict the orbit of Neptune.  
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such as are both true, and sufficient to explain the appearances’.  This rule seems to say 
that if some additional complexity (in the form of an additional cause)  is required to 
explain appearances, we should admit it, but not otherwise. The rule does not say that we 
should omit to introduce additional causes that are sufficient to explain appearances if the 
simplicity gain resulting from this omission outweighs the resulting loss in strength 
which is what the trade-off postulated in the BSA seems to require. Instead, Newton 
seems to be suggesting that the introduction of additional causes/complexity is always 
justified (perhaps required) if this leads to an improvement in strength. Your picture of 
trading off simplicity and strength seems to license arguments like the following: my 
theory doesn’t predict very much about planetary positions or movements but it is so 
much simpler than theories that do   that it achieves a better overall balance of simplicity 
and strength and is preferable for that reason.  Isn’t it obvious that this is not supported by  
generally accepted ideas about good scientific methodology?   
     Moreover, if this is right, then your story about Bode’s law does not work. Instead, on 
the assumption that strength has (near)  lexical priority over simplicity, it seems we 
should conclude that Bode’s law and other similar generalizations should after all be 
admitted as axioms in the Best Systemization (since their addition to the BS would lead 
to an increase in strength) , in which case they will count as laws, contrary to what 
everyone seems to agree is the correct assessment of their status11.   
 
 M:  I agree that the details of the BSA may require a little tweaking—some of us  are   
working on that. The important thing to bear in mind, though, is that simplicity and 
strength are important in theory-choice and that whatever the details may be, we can use 
them to provide a  properly reductive account of   laws.  I’d advise you to focus on this 
larger point and not get too distracted by niggling details.  The BSA is  the most 
metaphysically promising approach to laws of nature that we have, particularly since it is 
appropriately reductive.  So it must be right, at least in broad outline. Otherwise we 
would have a situation in which the laws of nature lack metaphysical foundations and are 
ungrounded, which is obviously intolerable.     
 
JW: Let me try a slightly different angle. You’ve said that the BSA is to be thought of as 
a systemization of the entire Humean Basis—  everything that happens in the entire 
universe over its entire life-time. 
 
M: That’s right. 
 
JW: But obviously scientists don’t have access to any thing like this when they formulate 
and test theories. So in this respect at least, the BSA does not describe how science 
actually proceeds.  
 
M:   It’s a thought experiment. We project from what the small corner of the universe to 
which we presently have access to everywhere and everywhen and then think in terms of 
competing systemizations of that.  
 
                                                
11 For more detail, see Woodward 2014.  
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JW: But this Humean Basis we end up imagining—it just involves at bottom what you 
describe as point-wise arrangements fundamental physical magnitude or something like 
that? And this is understood in such a way that no characterizations making reference to 
any kind of physical modality is allowed into the characterization of the basis?  
  
M: That’s right. If we let that stuff in we would, we would lose the possibility of a 
reduction. We would be caught in a circle.       
  
JW:  But now it looks as though  it is your aspiration to produce a reduction rather than 
anything grounded in how scientists actually reason  about laws that is driving your 
characterization of this supposed basis.   In one respect, the HB includes far more  
information (about what   happens everywhere in the universe over its entire life-time) 
than scientists in fact  have access to. In another respect, the Basis seems to include far 
less information, in comparison with the evidence and other considerations on which 
scientists actually rely in reasoning to conclusions about laws, causal relationships or 
other claims with modal content.  What I mean is that when I look at the ways in which 
scientists in various disciplines, including physics, infer or reason to conclusions   with 
modal content, they often seem to  make use of some version of the following schema:  
 
Prior assumptions about modal (causal or nomological)  relationships p + non-
modal information I about regularities, correlations, initial and boundary 
conditions  à conclusions about  other modal relationships (new modal 
knowledge) p*.  
 
For example, prior causal knowledge (e.g. that Y does not cause X and that X and Y are 
not caused by   some third variable   Z) can be combined with information about 
correlations  (e.g., that X and Y are correlated) to infer that X causes Y. Information about 
the trajectories of the planets of the sort represented by Kepler’s laws can be combined 
with very general nomologically committed assumptions (e.g. the motion of the planets is 
caused by some central force due to the sun) to derive the  gravitational inverse square 
law, as Newton himself showed.  
  If your characterization of the HB excludes all such prior causal or nomological 
information, how can it capture how scientists actually reason when they make causal or 
nomological inferences? And in general if our aim is to capture “our” (or scientists’) 
notion of law, shouldn’t we expect that notion to reflect or be shaped by the information 
that we actually have access to in reasoning about laws, rather than information we do not 
have access to?   
 
M: I don’t deny that scientists often reason on the basis of the considerations you 
describe. However,  it is obvious that it must be possible in principle  to reconstruct what 
they are doing so that it fits the BSA.  For example, if we take one of these assumptions -
- call it p--  with modal content that you are talking about and test it by making use of 
another assumption with modal content q  and so on, then  the worry is that we either (i) 
are led to a regress (testing assumption q requires  modally committed assumption r, 
testing r requires modal assumption s  and so on) that never ends up being grounded just 
in what is non-modal or else (ii) we end up with  a  circle (  having to assume p again).  
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Neither possibility is satisfactory from the point of view of justification. The only 
remaining alternative is that the modal assumptions on which we rely must ultimately   be 
justified in some other way, and this can only involve some sort of balancing of 
simplicity and strength.  Thus the inferences you describe ultimately must be 
reconstructable within the BS framework.    
 
JW:  I don’t understand why you are so confident that it must be possible to carry out this 
reconstruction.    
 
M:  If it is not possible to do so , you will be relying on   modal claims  that are not 
reducible and reasoning involving such claims will be unclear, involved in a regress, and 
circular.   
 
JW: First, I’m puzzled about why you phrase things in terms of whether it is possible to 
provide such a reconstruction or grounding or whatever, rather than in terms actually 
producing the reconstruction. If there is worry about modal claims being unclear and so 
on, why don’t we need to actually exhibit the details of the reconstructions/reductions 
you describe in order to assuage these worries12? Or at least provide enough of the details 
to make it plausible that such reconstructions are always going to be possible? But you’ve 
just agreed that the scientists employing modal claims do not in fact actually ground them 
in the way you describe and apparently don’t feel any need to produce reductions of the 
modal to the non-modal.  Moreover, you haven’t yet pointed to any epistemic or 
conceptual calamities that ensue from these omissions.  Indeed, if there were such 
calamities, why wouldn’t they appear in scientific practice and lead scientists themselves 
to be concerned to address them, which I take it that we both agree does not happen?      
In the absence of such defects, why isn’t the obvious moral  that the sort of reduction you 
are talking about just is not required if what one is interested in is elucidating how 
scientists and others provide evidence for, test, and reason about causal and nomological 
claims?   
  I can see why, given the way that metaphysicians conceive of what they are 
doing, there is a motivation within metaphysics for requiring that grounds/truth makers 
and perhaps reductions be produced,  but it sounded earlier as though you were claiming 
something more than that—that  such truth-makers   need to be provided if scientific 
inquiry is to  avoid circles and regresses, or to “make sense”  or avoid fatal unclarities or 
be adequately grounded  at some deeper level or something like that13.  Is your view 
                                                
12 And correspondingly to recognize that some modal claim is unclear or illegitimate, 
don’t we have to show that the required reduction cannot be produced?  This would 
presumably require consideration in some detail of  various ways that the reduction might 
go and showing that none of these succeed.   
13 Might we think of Metafisico’s view as something like the following: scientists don’t   
provide reductions of the modal notions they use and  typically have no opinions about 
(and don’t  seem to care about) whether it is possible to do so. Nonetheless (i) it is 
possible to do so and (ii) it is only because this is possible that the use of (unreduced) 
modal notions in science is legitimate. As nearly as I can see, there is nothing incoherent 
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perhaps that  doing metaphysics but not science requires providing grounds and truth-
makers? I’m happy to agree with that, as long as you agree that I am not required to do 
metaphysics  
I’ll add that, given that, as I think you  have  to acknowledge , the notions of 
“simplicity”  and “best balance” (and, for that matter, “strength”) that figure in the BS 
analysis are not exactly pellucid, I don’t see  that a reduction of modal notions via the 
BSA, even if it could be provided, would   somehow  endow   these notions  with a  
“clarity” and “intellectual  respectability” that they would otherwise lack,  at least in any 
ordinary sense of those words.  I think perhaps you are confusing  “sufficiently clear and  
unambiguous to guide reasoning, at least for certain purposes and contexts” with a certain 
conception of “reductive”.   
 
M:  This is getting tedious. As I have been trying to explain,  the cogency and legitimacy 
of the demand for reductive  truth-makers  for modal claims is acknowledged by many of 
the greatest philosophers,  past and present.  It is central to metaphysics.  Only an 
ontological  philistine would  resist this demand.  
 
JW: OK. Maybe I could get a better handle on what the BSA involves if we could discuss 
how it bears on another issue that I’m  interested in. This is has to do with the status of 
the various  l generalizations that figure in the so-called special sciences. These 
generalizations seem to have limited domains of application and typically have 
exceptions even within the domains in which they are intended to apply. Nonetheless we 
make distinctions   among these generalizations—some seem to describe causal relations 
and are accorded a central role in theory construction and causal explanation while 
others, although no more exception-ridden, are not regarded as having a different status. 
For example,  it is uncontroversial that changes in the money supply are usually 
correlated with changes in the inflation rate—there is a true or approximately true 
generalization describing this correlation. But in the comparatively recent past there was 
considerable disagreement among economists about whether changes in the money 
supply cause changes in the inflation rate or whether instead the causality runs in the 
opposite direction from inflation to money or whether instead the correlation between 
these two factors is due to some third factor. What does the BSA tell us about the 
difference (if any) between the claim that money and prices are correlated and the claim 
that money causes prices? If it is true that money causes prices, would it appropriate to 
think of this as a law of economics as some philosophers of social science have suggested 
or should we be thinking about it in some other way?   To take another example,  if I was 
an economist contemplating the Philips curve describing the inverse relationship between 
inflation and unemployment in the period before 1970, would the BS analysis tell me if I 
should regard  this generalization  as an economic law? Or whether we should  think  of  
it as describing a causal relationship rather than a mere correlation? 
 
M:  The status of generalizations in the special science is an interesting question  and one  
that is relatively unexplored within the BSA, which has focused mainly on laws in 
                                                                                                                                            
about this position. Nonetheless, it offers (and I see) no reason to believe either (i) or (ii).  
Thanks to Matthew Slater for some helpful comments here.  
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fundamental sciences like physics. Still several suggestions have recently emerged and 
are the subject of ongoing discussion.  It is probably most useful to begin with the version 
of the BSA  formulated by Lewis (e.g., 1999) and others. On this version, it seems 
doubtful whether there are any laws in the special sciences. For one thing, recall that the 
BSA  characterizes laws in terms of  a notion of simplicity that is tied to the perfectly 
natural properties; the laws will be generalizations that are simple when framed in terms 
of such properties.  Presumably the perfectly natural properties are, at least to a large 
extent, those that figure in fundamental physics.  It is unlikely that any of the properties   
that figure in the generalizations of the special sciences are perfectly natural.  When 
formulated in terms of perfectly natural properties from physics, the generalizations of 
the special sciences are likely to be horrendously complicated and non-simple. On this 
ground alone, they are disqualified as laws. To this it may be added that, often if not 
always, whether these special science  generalizations hold seems to depend on whether 
various physically contingent  initial and boundary conditions hold.  These initial and 
boundary conditions are likely to be very non-simple and to contribute relatively little to 
strength, since in many cases they will hold only very locally—e.g., in the case of the  
psychology and economics perhaps only for human beings and  a few other  organisms.  
So those initial/boundary conditions are unlikely to make it into the Best System.  Hence 
quite apart from the point about non-natural properties, the generalizations of the special 
sciences are unlikely to be derivable as theorems of the best system and hence are not 
laws.    
 
JW: I see.  I’m afraid, though, that  this doesn’t seem to help with the problems I 
described.   As I said, there does seem to be distinction  between those true 
generalizations in the special sciences that  describe causal relationships (and, at least 
according to me14,  have other features like stability or invariance under changes) and 
those true generalizations that do not have these features.  These seem  like distinctions 
that are tracking something in the world.  That is,  it looks to me as though there is a 
difference between, on  the one hand, the  way the world is if  it is true that money  
causes prices and, on the other hand the way that it is if money does not cause prices.  
And  there  are important issues about the sort of evidence that would be relevant to 
establishing  which if either of these claims  is true – that is why the social and behavioral 
sciences are full of procedures for inferring and testing causal claims .  Even if it is 
correct that there  are few laws in   the special sciences – a claim that I have defended 
myself --   if the   application of the BSA to the special sciences  classifies all true 
generalizations in the special sciences into an undifferentiated group as “non-laws” it 
does not seem to help with the issues that interest me.  Put differently, on this version of 
the BSA, the law/non-law distinction does not seem to correspond   to or to illuminate the 
causal/ merely correlational distinction that I would like to understand.   
 
M: The version of the BSA  we’ve been discussing may not help with the problems you 
describe, but does have a  consequence that is far more metaphysically important: if 
correct, it shows  that there are no laws outside of physics. This is a claim about what the 
world is like on a fundamental level and thus of the greatest ontological significance.  
                                                
14 Cf. Woodward, 2003. 
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Surely you don’t claim that the question of whether there are any laws outside of physics 
is unimportant?  
 
JW: I don’t think that asking whether the generalizations found in disciplines outside of 
physics are “laws”  is the  most useful way of  formulating issues about of the nature and 
status of  those generalizations.  In general, I think that you metaphysicians focus far too 
much on the notion of law.  I do think there are facts about whether various relationships 
studied in the special sciences are stable in various ways, about whether these can be 
exploited for purposes of manipulation and control and it is these features that 
philosophers of science should be interested in.  I don’t much care about whether you call 
these “laws”. Refusing to call these relationships “laws” doesn’t make them disappear or 
make them unworthy of study.  On the other hand merely bestowing the honorific “law” 
on them doesn’t do much to elucidate them either.  
 
M: Whatever. If you don’t like the consequences for the special sciences of the version of 
BSA  just sketched, here is a variant on this account which leads to results that you may 
find more appealing.  It is called the Better Best Systems account (Cohen and Callender, 
2009) and   in effect it relativizes the BSA to each of the special sciences15. Take some 
special science of interest—e.g., economics or ecology  with its proprietary predicates 
and its associated Humean  Basis described in terms of these predicates. Consider 
alternative systemizations {SE} of this Basis.  The laws of the science in question are then 
just those axioms (or axioms and theorems) that are common to the systemizations in  
{SE}  that achieve a best balance of simplicity and strength.   In fact,  we can think of this 
framework as supplying the underlying metaphysics that is missing from you talk of 
invariance and relations exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. Moreover, 
the respectability of the special sciences is restored, since we have shown  (or it least  we 
have shown how it might be possible, which is all that matters in metaphysics)  that they 
contain laws. This  result should  please you, as someone who is interested in these areas 
of inquiry and seems to take them more seriously than they probably deserve.  
 
JW:   I don’t mean to sound ungrateful, but I still have the feeling that  the problems that 
interest  me still haven’t been addressed.  If I have understood correctly, you would like 
to conceptualize the question  of whether money M causes prices  P as a claim about 
whether there is a law linking M and P. This law claim will be true or not depending on 
                                                
15 In the interest of fairness and completeness (and to avoid leaving a misleading 
impression about his views)  I should point out that  Callender has  been quite critical of  
some aspects of work in contemporary analytical metaphysics.   See his (2011). It is also 
true, as he has emphasized to me in correspondence, that many advocates of the BSA    
present it as an anti-metaphysical view of laws or at least an approach that carries 
minimal metaphysical commitments with it. I agree that it is a virtue of the BSA that it 
avoids the kind of metaphysics that postulates non- naturalistic special entities and 
relationships. On the other hand, at least from my perspective, the BSA retains some 
important metaphysical commitments, including its aspirations to provide a reduction of 
the modal to the actual and its reliance on ideas about “perfectly natural” predicates. It 
remains more metaphysical than some of its advocates realize.  
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whether this generalization is an axiom or theorem in the BBS. If instead, some  
appropriate generalization linking P to M was such an axiom or theorem, then it would be 
the case that P  causes M. Unlike the BS, the BBS thus at least allows for the possibility 
that one of these claims might turn out to be a law.  
 
M: That’s right. 
 
JW:  I  still don’t see how  to  use the BSA to determine which of these alternative law 
claims is correct, especially since the notions of simplicity and best balance on which you 
are relying have been left so vague and underspecified.  Maybe it would help if I posed 
matters this way:  Econometricians make use of various sorts of tests (”causality tests”)  
and appeal to certain kinds of evidence to try to determine whether M causes P or vice-
versa.  What does the BSA have to say about these? It just does not seem very helpful  in 
clarifying what the disagreement in this case is about or what sort of evidence is relevant 
to settling it. Does the application of the BSA to the special sciences show which of these 
“causality tests” are good ones for identifying causal relationships? Can we actually use it 
to distinguish genuine causal relationships from mere correlations in social science 
contexts?  
 
M:   It may well be true  that the BBS  can’t be used to   determine which of these 
competing causal claims is correct  if that is what you want to  know. But  if it is true that 
e.g. money causes prices, the BBS can be used to capture or represent the metaphysical 
status of this generalization in a satisfactory way, rather than leaving it obscure and 
mysterious, ontologically speaking, which is what you have done16.   More generally, I 
certainly wouldn’t expect metaphysics to be  “useful” in the sense you seem to have in 
mind or for metaphysical treatments of causation to cast light on issues of evidence and 
testing. Perhaps you might explain more clearly what it is that you are looking for.  I’ve 
always thought that a sharp separation of what is merely pragmatically useful (or of 
merely epistemic or methodological  significance, as  considerations having to do with 
evidence and testing are)   from the point of view of the parochial interests of human 
beings from issues about what is metaphysically true is one of the central achievements 
of contemporary analytic metaphysics.  The Sublime Uselessness of our subject has 
always been one of its most appealing characteristics for me.  
  
JW:  Here is an illustration of what I have in mind in talking about “usefulness”.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the interventionist approach to causation that I favor associates causal 
                                                
16    The reader may suspect   that what is going on in this example is that  a judgment 
about whether money causes prices or vice-versa is being made on some independent 
basis (i.e.,  some basis independent of explicit reliance of the BBS) and that  this 
judgment is then  being  used to support the assertion that (MàP) rather than (PàM) is  
a theorem (involving a best balance of simplicity and strength)  of the BBS , so that the 
latter assertion is, so to speak, an after the fact exercise in labeling or rationalization. I 
can only say that I sympathize with this reaction.  
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claims with claims about what the outcomes of hypothetical experiments would be, were 
an intervention to occur on the putative cause variable. I see this as having a number of 
implications for the methodology of constructing and testing causal claims.  Let me focus 
on   the latter— testing was not the main focus of my book, but it may help to suggest 
what I am driving at when I claim that an interventionist account of causation of the sort 
that I favor can be methodologically useful and when I worry that the sort of 
metaphysical foundations you are looking for are not likely to be useful for these sorts of 
purposes. Suppose that we are interested in using non- experimental evidence E,  in 
conjunction with other information I, to assess whether  X causes Y  is true. Then the 
question we should ask ourselves, according to interventionists, is whether E and I 
provide reason to think that, if a properly controlled experiment were to be performed in 
which X is manipulated, Y would change. In other words, in cases of causal inference 
from non-experimental data, we should think of ourselves as trying to infer from that data 
what the results of an experiment would be without actually carrying out the experiment--  
we use the hypothetical experiment to clarify what would be required to establish the 
causal conclusion on the basis of non-experimental information.  In fact, there are formal 
results about this:  it is possible to show that, given certain natural assumptions, we can 
infer that Y will change under an intervention on  X  from appropriate non-experimental 
data about correlations, given certain background assumptions.    For example, we can 
infer to this conclusion if there is some third variable Z which is (i) known to   cause X,  
(ii) known to cause Y if at all only through X and (iii) which is such  it is uncorrelated 
with other causes of Y  (except for those  variables if any on the causal route from Z to X 
to Y) .  A variable meeting these conditions is called an instrumental variable by 
econometricians and if   Z is such an instrument, and X and Y are correlated we can infer 
that X causes Y.   Indeed, we can provide a quantitative estimate of the  “treatment effect” 
of X on Y from information about the covariances of X, Y and Z: effect of X on Y= Cov 
(Y,Z)/Cov (X,Z) (cf. Winship and Morgan, 1999).  
 The relevance of this to interventionist treatments of causation is that the  
underlying logic is readily understandable in interventionist terms:  one can show that 
under conditions (i)- (iii), Z satisfies (modulo a complication17) my conditions for an 
intervention on X with respect to Y;  thus (according to the interventionist 
                                                
17 The complication is that although it follows from conditions (i)- (iii) that conditions 
(I1), (13) and (I4) in my characterization of an intervention (Woodward, 2003, p.98) are 
satisfied, it does not follow from (i) – (iii) that my remaining condition (I2) (that the 
intervention act as a switch or arrow-breaker with respect to X) is satisfied;  indeed in 
many real-life cases instrumental variables will not be switch-like.  Fortunately, 
Eberhardt (2007) in effect has shown that one may replace (I2) with a weaker condition 
(characterizing a so-called soft intervention) which does not require that interventions be 
switch-like  but only that they supply an exogenous source of variation in the variable 
intervened on that is uncorrelated with the other causes of that variable. This notion of a 
soft intervention enables many of the same inferences as one can make in the presence of 
arrow-breaking interventions and also can be used to define various causal notions 
characterized in Woodward, 2003.   Instrumental variables are very often interventions in 
this weaker sense.  
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characterization of causation) if X and Y covary under an intervention on X, then  X 
causes Y.    
There are many, many other examples of how thinking of problems of causal 
inference in non-experimental contexts  as though one were trying to ascertain what the 
results of a hypothetical experiment would be without actually doing the experiment  can 
help to elucidate what sort of evidence is required for reliable causal inference and can 
disambiguate and clarify competing causal claims  
  I’ll add that I don’t mean to single out the BS or BSS in suggesting that they don’t 
seem very relevant to epistemological or methodological issues associated with causal 
claims and laws.  Saying that the truth makers of causal claims (or laws) are facts about 
dispositions or relations of necessitation between universals seems equally unilluminating 
for purposes of understanding how can use evidence to assess causal claims, use such 
claims reliably in reasoning, and so on.    
  
M: Once again,  I think you misunderstand the goals that we metaphysicians have in 
looking for  truth makers and foundations.   We are not trying to address issues of non-
experimental or experimental design or to evaluate statistical techniques for testing causal 
claims.   We are looking for  something much deeper -- an  understanding of what is 
going on at the level of fundamental metaphysics.  
 
JW: Fair enough—I get that you are not trying to do methodology and also that you think 
that metaphysics of science should be done in a way that abstracts from all merely 
methodological or practical concerns.  What I do not get  is why you  also insist that I 
have to provide an account of the grounds or metaphysical foundations  for causal claims   
before I can address the epistemological and methodological issues that interest me.  On 
the contrary, given our discussion so  far,  it looks to me as though even if we had the 
right story about  the grounds or truth makers  for causal claims, this would not help with 
the issues that interest me.  
 
M: Metaphysics  does indeed bear an asymmetric relationship to the other topics you 
mention, but this should not be surprising in view of its foundational role. Briefly, 
epistemology and methodology are not at all relevant to metaphysics but metaphysics is 
highly relevant to them,  insofar as they have any philosophical interest. However, the 
details of how this works does not matter for present purposes and, in any case, is not  the 
concern of the metaphysician, as one can see by examining virtually any contemporary 
discussion of the metaphysics of causation.  But rather than continuing in this vein, let me 
try another tack. I take it from what you said above about interventions that a necessary 
condition for I to count as an intervention on X with respect to Y is that intervention I 
cause X. 
 
JW: That’s right.  
 
M: But then your account, which characterizes causation in terms of the response of Y to 
interventions on X is blatantly circular.  
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JW: I acknowledged in MTH that my account is non-reductive, although I also pointed 
out that the causal information that figures in the characterization   offered of what it is 
for X to cause Y has to do with other relationships besides the XàY relationship. In other 
words,  the characterization suggests how you  can use information about other causal 
relationships to assess whether X causes Y, but does not require that you have to already 
know whether X causes Y to use the characterization.  Thus the circularity involved in my 
characterization, such as it is, is not vicious, at least for epistemic purposes—indeed, at 
the level of particular causal claims, there is no circle at all, although there is also no 
reduction of those claims to claims that are non-causal18.  Incidentally, the example 
involving instrumental variables above provides a concrete illustration of this point—use 
of this method (when understood as above) requires prior causal knowledge but it can be 
used to provide evidence for   different causal relationships.  So a non-reductive account 
can be quite useful for epistemological or methodological purposes. Again  my 
conjecture, based on our conversation so far, is that accounts of laws and causal 
relationships that are reductive in aspiration are particularly unlikely to helpful in 
clarifying the methodological and epistemological issues that interest me, both because 
the notions that figure in reductive accounts (simplicity and so on) are so unclear and 
because in the interests of making the reduction work philosophers seem to end up 
misrepresenting what it is they are trying to reduce, as with the idea that good scientific 
method involves a trade-off of simplicity and strength.  I think that a similar point holds 
for the non-reductive accounts of truth makers that you have mentioned.  
 
M:   I’m afraid that you completely lack an ear for metaphysics.  You are one of the most 
ontologically shallow people I have ever met. (Aside: It is not vouchsafed to just anyone 
to discern the lineaments of Being.)  
 
JW:  I fully agree. Let me buy you a drink.  
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